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Total gross social protection expenditure as a share of GDP in Austria increased from 
28% in 2005 to 30.3% in 2016. The corresponding figures for net social expenditure 
were 24.5% and 26.7%. When compared with the EU-28 average, both net and 
(especially) gross social expenditure were comparatively high. The above-average 
difference between net and gross social expenditure derives from the fact that the 
effective tax and contribution rate on social protection spending (resulting from taxes 
and contributions levied on benefit recipients), amounting to around 10%, is higher in 
Austria than in many other countries.  
Between 2005 and 2016 the traditional drivers of social protection expenditure, namely 
spending on old age and health/sickness, continued to show substantial real growth. 
Other spending areas with above-average real growth were unemployment and 
(especially more recently) social exclusion. Overall, it should be stressed that social 
policy in Austria until recently did not pursue a strategy of explicit welfare retrenchment. 
Cost-containment applied in the area of pensions by closing exit pathways from the 
labour market in the form of early-retirement schemes; in the area of health services via 
soft governance approaches to increasing efficiency; or in the area of family cash 
benefits in the form of only irregular indexing. On the other hand, in areas such as active 
labour market policies and institutional childcare, Austria followed more a ‘social 
investment approach’. Overall, this – together with demographic ageing and persistent 
(by Austrian standards) high unemployment – resulted in an increase in social 
expenditure, both at constant prices and as a share of GDP. 
In Austria around 62% of all financing for gross social protection expenditure derived 
from social insurance contributions in 2016, 36.6% from general government 
contributions and 1.3% from other receipts. The share of social (insurance) contributions 
declined somewhat after 2005, whereas the share of general government contributions 
increased. Overall from an international comparative point of view, the Austrian system 
of financing social expenditure rather heavily relied on social contributions. Against the 
background of the financial and economic crisis, the growth rate of social insurance 
contributions exhibited a sharp decline in 2009 and general government contributions 
had to step in to secure overall sufficient receipts. After some economic consolidation and 
an actual reduction in social expenditure (as a share of GDP and at constant prices) in 
2011, the development of real growth in funding from the two main sources showed a 
‘reversed’ pattern: the higher the growth rate for social insurance contributions, the 
lower the growth rate for general government contributions, and vice versa. This 
phenomenon might be explained by the fact that general government contributions de 
facto absorbed costs not financed by social insurance contributions. 
Overall, changes in the design of social security contributions have been rather limited 
over the last 15 years. Rules on floors and caps have remained largely unchanged. Some 
attempts have been made to slightly reduce specific contribution rates in order to reduce 
non-wage labour costs, but the system of contribution rates remained largely regressive. 
Attempts to widen social security coverage, in particular, took place in the 1990s. 
The Austrian system of financing social expenditure comes with a number of problems 
and challenges. A heavy reliance on income tax and social insurance contributions makes 
the system vulnerable to demographic ageing and economic swings. Comparatively high 
overall non-wage labour costs are also likely to curb employment growth and to be 
problematic in terms of work incentives. Furthermore, the Austrian system of taxes and 
contributions has only a slightly progressive effect. Reform options could include 
attempting to transform the systems of social insurance contributions and income tax 
into one ‘integrated tariff’. Such a reform could at the same time reduce the tax wedge 
on low and medium earned income, increase the overall progressivity of the system and 
‘broaden the financing base’ of social protection (by also integrating rental, leasing and 
interest income). Other measures to compensate for the likely costs of such a reform, 
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and to safeguard long-term financial sustainability, would be a reintroduction of taxes on 
assets/property and attempts to prevent tax evasion, especially by international 
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1 Current levels and past changes in financing social protection  
Total gross social protection expenditure as a share of GDP in Austria increased from 
28% in 2005 to 30.3% in 2016. The timeline shows a reduction between 2005 and 2007, 
and increase between 2007 and 2009, then another fall until 2011, before positive 
growth thereafter (see Chart 1). For most years until 2013 the trend was in the same 
direction as the EU-28 average. However, after that the EU-28 average showed some 
decline, whereas gross social protection expenditure as a share of GDP continued to grow 
in Austria. 
Chart 1: Gross expenditure on social protection as % of GDP; Austria and EU-28 
2005-2016 
 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS1 database; indicator [spr_exp_sum]. 
 
It is not only the development of social protection expenditure that contributes to 
changes in this indicator (i.e. social protection expenditure as a share of GDP), but also 
the development of real GDP. For this reason, both parameters have to be taken into 
account. 
Real GDP showed positive growth in Austria in all years except 2009 and 2013, with an 
actual recession in 2009 and zero growth in 2013 (see Charts 2 and 3). This implies that 
the strong growth of gross social protection as a share of GDP in 2009 partly also 
resulted from a decline in GDP. Overall, between 2005 and 2016 total real GDP growth 
was around 15%. 
 
                                                 
1 European System of integrated Social PROtection Statistics. 
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Chart 2: Gross social protection expenditure and GDP (at constant prices; 
2005=100), Austria 2005-2016 
 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database; indicator [spr_exp_sum]; Eurostat indicator [nama_10_gdp] & own 
calculations. 
 
Chart 3: Social protection expenditure and GDP (at constant prices); annual 
growth rate (%); Austria 2006-2016 
 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database; indicator [spr_exp_sum]; Eurostat indicator [nama_10_gdp] & own 
calculations. 
 
The data in Charts 2 and 3 also show that gross social protection expenditure in Austria 
grew throughout the period examined in real terms, with the exception of 2011. Growth 
was especially distinct in 2008, 2009 and 2016. Regarding the year 2011, it should be 
noted that nominal gross social expenditure increased by around 2% when compared 
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with 2010.2 This was the lowest increase in all the years between 2005 and 2016, when 
the yearly growth rate of nominal spending was always at least around 3% (and in many 
years substantially higher). What also has to be taken into account in this context is that 
2011 was the year with the highest price inflation in Austria (amounting to 3.6%3). This, 
together with a comparatively small increase in nominal social protection expenditure,4 
led to a drop in expenditure at constant prices (i.e in real terms). Overall, between 2005 
and 2016 real gross expenditure on social protection increased by 22%.  
To get a closer picture of these developments it is useful to analyse the composition of 
social protection expenditure by function, and the changes in spending for each 
function (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1: Composition of gross spending on social protection benefits according 
to function (%), Austria 2005-2016 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Old age 40.0 40.8 41.4 41.7 41.9 42.4 43.2 43.8 44.2 44.6 44.4 44.0 
Sickness/Healthcare 25.5 25.4 26.0 26.3 25.7 25.3 25.6 25.6 25.3 25.3 25.4 25.6 
Family/Children 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.2 9.8 9.7 9.5 9.6 9.5 
Disability 8.3 8.0 7.7 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.4 
Survivors 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.8 
Unemployment 5.8 5.8 5.3 4.9 5.7 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.8 
Social exclusion n.e.c. 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.6 
Housing 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database; indicator [spr_exp_sum] & own calculations. 
 
The bulk of Austria’s social protection expenditure – as in most other member states – 
was on old age, which made up 44.0 % of the total in 2016 (see Table 1). Spending on 
this area experienced an upward trend over the period examined, exceeding the real 
growth of total social protection spending in all years except 2015 and 2016 (see Table 
2). For this reason, the share of spending on old age increased by 4 percentage points 
over the period. Demographic developments meant that the share of people aged 65 
years and older increased from 15.9% to 18.4% in the period 2005-2016, while the 
share of people aged 20-64 remained almost constant at just over 60% (Statistics 
Austria 2017). Overall, the number of persons receiving at least one old-age pension 
from statutory pension insurance and/or a civil servants' pension (so-called Ruhegenuss) 
increased from 1.357 million in 2005 to around 1.877 million in 2016, or by around 
38%.5  
The tendency for the growth rate in old-age spending to decline towards the end of the 
period under review is likely to have been caused by a rise in the effective retirement 
age. For men, the average effective retirement age rose from 58.5 in 2010 to 60.3 in 
2016 regarding all direct pensions financed by statutory old-age insurance (including 
invalidity pensions and so-called rehabilitation benefit, replacing temporary invalidity 
benefit as from 2014). The respective ages for women were 57.1 and 58.5. If invalidity 
pensions and rehabilitation benefit are not taken into account (i.e. focusing on direct old-
                                                 
2 Source: Eurostat; ESSPROS, indicator [spr_exp_sum] & own calculations. 
3 Source: Eurostat database, indicator [prc_hicp_aind]. 
4 This was – inter alia – caused by the fact that spending on active labour market policies, after a substantial 
expansion in 2009 and 2010, was substantially cut in 2011. 
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age pensions only), the rise for men was from 60.5 in 2010 to 63.3 in 2016, and for 
women from 59.3 to 60.3. Overall, different attempts to progressively close early-exit 
pathways from the labour market via early-retirement schemes had a short-term cost-
containment effect for statutory old-age insurance. In real terms, spending by such 
schemes fell by 16.4% between 2005 and 2016, and from 8% to 5.5% of total old-age 
expenditure.6 
From a more long-term perspective, cost-containment effects will especially result from 
the old-age pension reforms of 2001 and 2003 (see e.g. Fink 2009 and Knell et al. 2006 
for a more detailed assessment), coming into force in stages according to transitional 
arrangements. Nonetheless, according to projections provided in the European 
Commissions’ 2018 Ageing Report, total public pension expenditure in Austria will rise 
from 13.8% of GDP in 2016 to 14.9% in 2040, then reaching a level substantially above 
the EU-27 average in 2040 of 12.7% (see European Commission 2018, 66). For old-age 
and early pensions alone (i.e. without survivor’s pensions and disability pensions) costs 
are projected to increase from 10.5% of GDP in 2016 to 12.4% of GDP in 2040. 
Table 2: Spending on social protection benefits according to function (at 2010 






































































Old age 3.9 2.9 4.1 5.1 2.5 0.8 2.8 2.2 2.6 1.4 1.6 34.3 2.7 
Sickness/ 
Healthcare 
1.3 3.8 4.5 2.2 -0.2 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.3 2.2 3.5 22.5 1.9 
Family/ 
Children 
-0.7 -1.1 3.9 4.7 2.2 -6.8 -2.2 0.1 -0.7 3.0 2.0 4.0 0.4 
Disability -1.7 -2.3 -0.5 3.7 1.6 0.5 -0.7 -1.9 -1.3 -2.6 -1.2 -6.4 -0.6 
Survivors 0.3 -0.1 0.6 1.1 -1.1 -2.5 0.6 -0.4 -1.3 0.0 -0.7 -3.6 -0.3 
Unemploy- 
ment 




5.7 2.8 3.9 -2.5 4.3 4.4 7.7 6.0 4.2 23.8 37.4 142.8 8.9 
Housing 15.5 3.0 15.0 3.6 -1.9 -8.9 -7.5 -12.5 8.8 0.2 -0.3 11.4 1.4 
Total  2.0 1.4 3.3 4.6 1.3 -0.9 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.7 22.4 1.9 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database; indicator [spr_exp_sum] & own calculations. 
 
The second biggest area of social protection spending was healthcare and sickness 
benefits, amounting to roughly a quarter of all expenditure, a share that stayed largely 
constant between 2005 and 2016 (see Table 1). Healthcare/sickness spending grew in 
real terms in every year except 2010, the most significant increases being in 2007, 2008 
and 2016. Total real growth amounted to around 22.5% between 2005 and 2016, 
whereas real GDP growth amounted to around 15%. According to one of the declared 
goals of the so-called health reform of 2012-2013, health spending should not grow at a 
higher rate than GDP, and a number of cost-containment measures (in the first instance 
aimed at optimising governance and planning) have been decided on for this purpose 
(see e.g. Hofmarcher 2014). However, the real annual growth rate of healthcare/sickness 
                                                 
6 Source: Own calculations based on national ESSPROS tables provided by the National Ministry for Labour, 
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expenditure was somewhat higher than real annual GDP growth in every year after the 
reform (see Table 2 and Chart 3). This can be explained by, inter alia, demographic 
ageing and rising costs for high-quality treatments and related infrastructure. 
Furthermore, for a long time, rising costs for in-patient hospital care (amounting to 
c.45% of all healthcare/sickness spending in 2016) were one of the main drivers of rising 
expenditure in Austria. However, since the 2012-2013 reform, related spending has 
tended to increase at a somewhat slower pace than total healthcare/sickness spending. 
This was in line with the reform, which was aimed at promoting out-patient/ambulatory 
care instead of in-patient hospital care. In 2016, around 35% of all healthcare/sickness 
spending was on out-patient/ambulatory care.7 
According to projections (AWG8 reference scenario) provided in the European 
Commission’s 2018 Ageing Report, health spending in Austria will increase from 7% of 
GDP in 2016 to 7.7% of GDP in 2040 and then further to 8.2% in 2060 (see European 
Commission 2018, 335). When compared with the EU-27 average, this indicates a rather 
strong growth trend for Austria (see ibid., 123). 
Other spending areas showing an interesting development were, especially, 
‘family/children’, ‘unemployment’ and ‘social exclusion (n.e.c.9)’. 
The share of family/children spending in total social protection expenditure fell from 
11.2% in 2005 to 9.5% in 2016 (see Table 1). At the same time, several years (namely 
2006, 2007, 2011, 2012 and 2014) showed a fall in real spending for this function (see 
Table 2). This was – inter alia – caused by the fact that important family benefits in 
Austria were not regularly indexed. Overall, between 2005 and 2016 family/children 
spending grew by around 4% each year in real terms (see ibid.). Universal family 
allowance (Familienbeihilfe) is the single most important area of family/children 
spending. Spending on this benefit amounted to around 36% of the total in 2015, but its 
share had been even higher in 2005 (41%).10 Spending on it at fixed prices (i.e. in real 
terms) fell by around 11% between 2005 and 2016. At the same time spending on 
institutional childcare increased by around 103%, with its share of family/children 
spending rising from 11% in 2005 to 22% in 2016. The latter was caused by, inter alia, a 
deliberate strategy to increase the coverage of institutional childcare. 
In the period 2005 to 2016, spending on unemployment amounted to between 4.9% 
and 5.8% of total social protection expenditure (see Table 1). Real annual growth in this 
area showed substantial volatility, with a strong increase in 2009 and also 2013, and 
substantial falls in 2007 and especially 2011 (see Table 2). This can partly be explained 
by changes in the unemployment rate, which fell from 5.7% in 2005 to 4.2% in 2008.11 
Against the background of the international economic and financial crisis, unemployment 
increased to 5.4% in 2009 and then declined again to 4.6% in 2011. After that it went up 
again, reaching 6.1% in 2016. Real changes in spending on unemployment were largely 
in line with this, but 2009, when there was a real increase of related spending amounting 
to over 21%, stands out. This was also caused by a deliberate roll-out of specific policies 
aimed at preventing unemployment, such as (in particular) increased financing for the 
short-time work scheme. Overall, spending on active and activating labour market 
policies as a share of all unemployment spending remained largely stable, amounting to 
                                                 
7 Source: Own calculations based on national ESSPROS tables provided by the National Ministry for Labour, 
Social Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection; 
https://www.sozialministerium.at/cms/site/attachments/5/4/4/CH3434/CMS1542959477181/essoss_ueberblick
stabelle_2_(funktionen)_2.1-2.9.2017.xlsx.  
8 Working Group on Ageing Populations. 
9 ‘n. e. c.’ stands for ‘not elsewhere classified’. 
10 Source: Own calculations based on national ESSPROS tables provided by the National Ministry for Labour, 
Social Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection; 
https://www.sozialministerium.at/cms/site/attachments/5/4/4/CH3434/CMS1542959477181/essoss_ueberblick
stabelle_2_(funktionen)_2.1-2.9.2017.xlsx.  
11 Source: Labour Force Survey; Eurostat database, indicator [lfsa_urgan]. 
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around 38% in both 2005 and 2016.12 The same holds for expenditure on unemployment 
benefit (Arbeitslosengeld) (c.29% in both years), whereas the share of spending on 
unemployment assistance13 (Notstandshilfe) increased from 18% to 24%. It was 
especially after 2009 that spending on unemployment assistance showed real growth, 
substantially faster than that on unemployment as a whole. This suggests that a rising 
number of unemployed people failed to re-integrate into employment on an enduring 
basis. At the same time these developments were not caused by policy reforms, as no 
major structural reforms were decided regarding cash transfers from unemployment 
insurance. 
Finally, the data in Table 1 show that the share of spending on ‘social exclusion n.e.c.’ 
in all social protection expenditure increased from 1.3% in 2005 to 2.6% in 2016. The 
real growth rate of spending for this function exceeded that for total expenditure in most 
years, but the years 2015 and 2016, with growth rates of around 24% and around 37%, 
stand out. The latter increases were primarily caused by a substantially increased influx 
of asylum-seekers and refugees in these years. From a more long-term perspective, 
rising costs for this function are caused by a general rise in the number of benefit 
recipients: this is probably the result of higher benefit take-up, together with rising 
demand due to an increasing differentiation of opportunities and risks in the labour 
market – resulting, for example, in low-income employment, where benefits from 
minimum-income schemes may be used as a top-up to low earnings from gainful 
employment.  
Overall, it should be stressed that social policy in Austria until recently did not pursue a 
strategy of explicit welfare retrenchment. Cost-containment applied in the area of 
pensions in the form of closing exit pathways from the labour market through early-
retirement schemes; in the area of health services via soft governance approaches to 
increasing efficiency; or in the area of family cash benefits through only irregular 
indexing. On the other hand, in other areas, for example active labour market policies 
and institutional childcare, Austria followed more a ‘social investment approach’. Overall, 
this – together with demographic ageing and persistent (by Austrian standards) high 
unemployment – resulted in an increase in social expenditure (both at constant prices 
and as a share of GDP). 
It should be noted that all the data presented above are for gross social spending. 
However, social benefits may be subject to income tax and/or social insurance 
contributions: this is especially true for pension benefits. A contribution rate of 5.1% of 
the gross pension benefit applies for health insurance, and pensions are also subject to 
income tax. According to Statistics Austria, in 2014 around 60% of all pensioners actually 
paid income tax, having income above the yearly minimum income threshold14 (Statistics 
Austria 2017a). One other important source of income tax is health/sickness cash 
benefits, whereas family/children cash benefits and unemployment insurance benefits are 
generally not subject to income tax or social insurance contributions. Net social 
spending is calculated by deducting taxes and social insurance contributions on social 
benefits from gross social expenditure. The effective tax and contribution rate on 
social protection expenditure amounted to 9.8% in 2007 (2.3% contributions and 7.6% 
taxes), 9.6% in 2010 (contributions 2.3% and taxes 7.3%) and 10.4% in 2015 
                                                 
12 Source: Own calculations based on national ESSPROS tables provided by the National Ministry for Labour, 
Social Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection; 
https://www.sozialministerium.at/cms/site/attachments/5/4/4/CH3434/CMS1542959477181/essoss_ueberblick
stabelle_2_(funktionen)_2.1-2.9.2017.xlsx.  
13 Transfer benefits from unemployment insurance in Austria include unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld) 
and unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe). Unemployed people meeting the eligibility criteria first get 
unemployment benefit, where the maximum duration (between 20 and 52 weeks) depends on the age of the 
benefit claimant and their previous employment and insurance record. When the right to receive unemployment 
benefit has expired, benefit claimants may apply for unemployment assistance, where in principle no maximum 
period applies. 
14 Currently amounting to €11,000 per year. 
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(contributions 2.3% and taxes 8.1%). As a result, in Austria net social expenditure is 
around 10% lower than gross social expenditure. This difference is higher in Austria than 
in most other EU Member States; but the Netherlands and Denmark, in particular, show 
an even bigger gap between gross and net social expenditure. Net social expenditure as 
a share of GDP in Austria amounted to 24.4% in 2007 (gross spending was 27%; see 
also Chart 1 above), 26.8% in 2010 (gross 29.6%) and 26.7% in 2015 (gross 29.8%). 
Overall, no major change occurred during the period regarding the tax and contributions 
treatment of social benefits in Austria, resulting in a largely stable tax and contribution 
rate.  
At the same time, it is worth noting that the share of means-tested social expenditure in 
total social protection expenditure in Austria was somewhat below the EU average. In 
2016 9.7% of all social protection expenditure derived from means-tested measures (EU-
28 average: 12.1%). This compared with 7.6% in 2015,15 the rise being primarily caused 
by an above-average growth of spending on minimum-income schemes (see above). 
When comparing gross social protection expenditure with social protection receipts 
according to ESSPROS, it becomes evident that the data for Austria regularly indicate a 
budgetary deficit rather than a surplus (see Table 3). These data are for gross 
expenditure and receipts without transfers: nonetheless, it is unclear at the time of 
writing how exactly to interpret the deficits indicated.  
                                                 
15 Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database. 
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Table 3: Gross social protection expenditure and social protection receipts (€m at 2010 prices), Austria 2005-2016 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total receipts 76,952  78,365  79,391  82,104  84,904  85,870  86,287  87,908  89,011  90,004  91,112  93,545  
Total expenditure 77,790  79,126  80,341  82,976  86,646  87,637  86,853  88,160  89,328  90,572  92,189  94,866  
Total receipts minus 
total expenditure 
-839  -761  -949  -873  -1,742  -1,767  -567  -253  -317  -567  -1,077  -1,321  
Deficit/surplus as  
% of total 
expenditure 
-1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 -2.0 -2.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -1.2 -1.4 
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2 Current mix and past changes in the sources of financing for 
social protection  
Turning to the sources of financing for social protection expenditure,16 one can 
distinguish three main sources: social (insurance) contributions, general government 
contributions and other receipts.  
In Austria, around 62% of all financing for social protection derived from social insurance 
contributions in 2016, 36.6% from general government contributions and about 1.3% 
from other receipts (see Table 4). The share of social (insurance) contributions fell 
somewhat over the period examined, whereas the share of general government 
contributions increased.  
Chart 4 shows the real annual growth rate of total social protection receipts and of those 
from the two main components, social (insurance) contributions and general government 
contributions. It is evident that the growth of social insurance contributions slowed 
sharply in 2009 and that general government contributions had to step in to compensate. 
After some economic consolidation and an actual reduction of social expenditure (as a 
share of GDP and at constant prices) in 2011 (see Chart 1 and Chart 2 above), the 
development of real growth in funding from the two main sources show a ‘reversed’ 
pattern: the higher the growth rate for social insurance contributions the lower the 
growth rate for general government contributions, and vice versa. This phenomenon 
might be explained by the fact that general government contributions de facto absorb 
costs not financed by social (insurance) contributions. 
 
Chart 4: Real annual change in social protection receipts by main source (%), 
Austria 2005-2016 
 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database; indicator [spr_rec_sumt] & own calculations. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Time series on deficits/surpluses according to spending area are not readily available from national ESSPROS 
data provided by Statistics Austria and/or the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs. 
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Table 4: Division of financing for social protection by main source (%), Austria 2005-2016  
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Social contributions 63.9 64.0 64.3 64.3 62.5 62.1 62.5 62.0 62.4 62.1 62.3 62.0 
General government contributions 34.7 34.7 34.5 34.3 35.9 36.3 35.9 36.6 36.0 36.6 36.5 36.6 
Other receipts 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 
Total receipts 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 




Table 5: Social contributions by employers, employees, self-employed and benefit recipients (% total social protection 
receipts), Austria 2005-2016 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Employers 37.0 37.2 37.5 37.6 36.5 36.3 36.6 36.2 36.4 36.1 36.2 36.0 
Employees 21.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 20.9 20.7 20.8 20.6 20.8 20.7 20.8 20.7 
Self-employed 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Benefit recipients 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 
Total social contributions 63.9 64.0 64.3 64.3 62.5 62.1 62.5 62.0 62.4 62.1 62.3 62.0 
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Social insurance contributions can be further differentiated between contributions by 
employers, by employees, by self-employed people and by benefit recipients. The data in 
Table 5 show that the share of these different sources in total social protection receipts 
remained largely stable over the period. Around 36-37% of all receipts derived from 
social contributions by employers, and around 21-22% from those by employees. Social 
contributions by self-employed people accounted for 3% of all receipts in 2016, after 
rising slightly since 2010. The share of contributions by benefit recipients remained 
largely stable at around 2.3%. 
In the same way as the components of social expenditure showed little relative change 
over the period examined, their sources of financing also showed only limited change in 
most cases (see Table 6).  
Old-age spending showed a small reduction in financing from social contributions and 
some increase in government revenue and from other receipts. Nonetheless, social 
contributions continued to dominate. 
The latter was even more true for spending on survivors, though some increase in other 
receipts was evident. 
Financing for healthcare/sickness did not show much change over time. But some 
reduction in the share coming from social contributions was evident, and some relative 
increase in that of government revenue. ‘Other receipts’ in this case primarily comprised 
transfers from other systems, namely from unemployment insurance (for unemployed 
persons receiving unemployment insurance benefits), from the so-called Family Benefits 
Equalisation Fund (Familienlastenausgleichsfonds, FLAG) for parents receiving childcare 
allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld), and from occupational accident insurance. 
Table 6: Division of financing for social protection by main source and function 
(% total financing of the function), Austria 2005-2016 
Function 
  





























































Old age 60.4 60.7 57.8 57.7 34.9 34.6 36.5 36.5 4.7 4.7 5.8 5.8 
Survivors 65.5 65.8 63.1 63.9 30.6 30.3 31.7 30.7 3.9 4.0 5.2 5.4 
Healthcare/sickness 48.2 48.0 46.7 46.9 19.0 19.4 20.1 20.0 32.7 32.6 33.3 33.2 
Disability 53.1 50.7 46.1 44.5 38.4 40.3 43.4 44.3 8.5 9.0 10.5 11.2 
Family/children 49.7 52.6 51.0 52.0 45.8 43.0 43.9 43.0 4.4 4.4 5.1 5.0 
Unemployment 90.9 97.5 97.2 95.5 8.2 1.5 2.1 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.7 2.0 
Housing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.0 96.6 96.4 95.9 4.0 3.4 3.6 4.1 
Social exclusion n.e.c. 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 79.4 80.2 80.6 81.9 20.0 19.4 19.1 18.0 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database. 
 
For disability spending, a substantial increase in the share of government revenues was 
evident, and some fall in social contributions. This appeared to be caused by a 
substantial increase in spending by federal provinces and municipalities on ‘assistance for 
disabled people’ (Behindertenhilfe), which is financed from general taxes. ‘Other receipts’ 
primarily comprised transfers from other schemes. 
Regarding family/children spending, not much change was evident after 2008, but the 
share of social contributions showed an increase between 2005 and 2008, whereas that 
of general government revenues fell during the same period. 
The financing structure for housing spending was largely stable, with more than 95% of 
all finances coming from the tax yield.  
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Social exclusion n.e.c. was also dominated by tax financing. Furthermore, about one fifth 
of spending was covered by ‘other receipts’. These were primarily transfers between the 
federal provinces and the municipalities, with most of the related funds de facto financed 
from taxes. 
Overall, the Austrian system of financing social expenditure relies rather heavily 
on social contributions from an international comparative point of view. The above-
mentioned 62% of all social protection receipts coming from social contributions in 2016 
substantially surpassed the EU-28 average (54.5%). A comparable situation applied to 
financing of net social protection expenditure (see above Section 1). In Austria in 2015 
67% of all receipts financing net social protection expenditure were derived from social 
insurance contributions, whereas the EU-28 average was 55.3%. 
Table 7 gives an overview of social insurance contribution rates for the most 
important branches of compulsory insurance within the private sector for different types 
of employment, and of the so-called marginal earnings threshold and maximum 
contribution basis. Forms of employment covered in the table are ‘standard’ 
employees, self-employed crafts- and tradespeople registered with the Economic 
Chamber and two types of so-called non-standard employment, namely 
‘freelance/independent contractors’ (Freie Dienstnehmer) and ‘new self-employed’ (not 
registered with the Economic Chamber) (for more details see Fink/Nagl 2018 and Fink 
2017).17 It is worth noting that freelance contractors and new self-employed were not 
covered by statutory insurance until the middle of the 1990s, with statutory insurance for 
these groups only introduced in 1996. The declared goal of the latter reforms was to 
prevent people from evading compulsory insurance and to integrate all types of earned 
income from employment into social security (Tálos 1999, 276). 
The basic features of insurance rules for these groups have remained largely the same 
over the last 15 years, with some changes only regarding contribution rates (see below). 
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Employer: 1.53% Employer: 
1.53% 
1.53% 1.53% 
1 Tradespeople registered with the Economic Chamber. 
2 New self-employed not registered with the Economic Chamber. 
3 The marginal earnings threshold (gross earnings/month) applies to standard workers and independent 
contractors. See text in this Section for more details. 
4 The minimum contribution basis applies to self-employed tradespeople and new self-employed. Tradespeople 
have to pay insurance contributions according to the minimum contribution basis even if actual earnings turn 
out to be lower than it. For new self-employed the minimum contribution basis also serves as a yearly 
marginal earnings threshold (€446.81 x 12 = €5,361.72), with no compulsory insurance in case of income 
from this type of employment below this level. 
5,6 Standard workers get two months of special payments per year. These are also subject to social insurance 
contributions, up to the normal maximum monthly contribution basis (Höchtbeitragsgrundlage). Independent 
contractors may or may not be granted special payments, depending on agreement with their employer. If no 
special payment is agreed, a higher maximum monthly contribution basis of €6,090 applies (€5,220 x 14/12). 
The same maximum contribution basis also applies to tradespeople and for new self-employed. 
7 For tradespeople newly registered with the Economic Chamber and starting a new business, a flat-rate 
insurance contribution applies for health insurance during the first two years. It amounts to 7.65% of the 
minimum contribution basis (€446.81, i.e. €34.18 per month). 
8 This fund pays displaced workers any wages owed and other claims not covered by the insolvent firm’s 
assets.  
Source: Main Association of Austrian Social Insurance Providers. 
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Standard employment contracts and independent contracts with a gross monthly income 
below the marginal earnings threshold (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze) of €446.81 in 201918 are 
– with the exception of accident insurance – not subject to statutory social insurance. 
This is called marginal part-time employment. However, workers reaching the marginal 
earnings threshold for compulsory health or pension insurance through a combination of 
several marginal part-time contracts or a combination with other insured income from 
gainful employment are liable for the same (employee) social insurance contributions as 
standard employees for health and pension insurance of 14.12% (3.87% plus 10.25% – 
see Table 7).19 Companies employing several people on marginal part-time employment 
contracts have to pay a general social insurance contribution to health and pension 
insurance if the total wage bill for those people in marginal part-time employment 
exceeds 1.5 times the marginal earnings threshold.20 This general social insurance 
contribution paid by the employer amounts to 16.4% of the contribution base. These 
rules were introduced in the late 1990s to reduce fiscal incentives for marginal part-time 
employment. Nonetheless, insurance contributions for marginal part-time employment 
remain lower than for contracts with income above the marginal earnings threshold, as 
no unemployment insurance applies. 
Insurance contributions have to be paid on income up to the maximum contribution basis 
(Höchstbeitragsgrundlage), in 2019 amounting to €5,220 per month for standard 
employees. As standard employees in Austria receive 14 salaries per year, the maximum 
yearly contribution basis amounts to €73,080 (i.e. €5,220 x 14). As with the marginal 
earnings threshold, the maximum contribution basis is subject to annual indexing 
according to wage growth. 
All active registered crafts- and tradespeople have to pay insurance contributions on a 
contribution base of at least €466.81 per month for health insurance, and of at least 
€654.25 per month for pension insurance, regardless of their actual income. This means 
that for tradespeople, the rules on marginal part-time employment do not apply. Their 
maximum contribution base is the same as that for employees and independent 
contractors. For the new self-employed, compulsory insurance begins once annual 
income from this type of self-employment exceeds the marginal earnings threshold of 
(currently) €5,361.72.21 Insurance contributions again only have to be paid on income up 
to the maximum contribution basis. It is worth noting that the yearly maximum 
contribution basis of (currently) €73,080 also applies to a combination of earned income 
from different sources (such as from a combination of self-employment and dependent 
employment). 
The basic rules sketched out above have remained largely unchanged over the last 15 
years. However, some minor changes applied to contribution rates.  
For employees, the total health insurance contribution amounted to 6.9% in 2003 and 
was increased to 7.4% in 2004 and then further to 7.5% in 2005 and 7.65% in 2008. 
Since then, it has remained unchanged.22 The contribution rate to the insolvency 
remuneration fund was reduced from 0.7% to 0.55% in 2008 and then further to 0.45% 
                                                 
18 The figure is subject to annual indexation according to preceding wage growth. 
19 Since the late 1990s, persons in marginal part-time employment may also opt in to health insurance and 
pension insurance if no compulsory insurance applies. The monthly costs of opting in to health and pension 
insurance is currently (2019) €63.07 per month. In effect, this option creates a very low-cost opportunity to 
obtain health insurance and contribution periods for pension insurance. 
20 The threshold is 1.5 x €446.81 = €670.22. 
21 This income limit is equal to the monthly marginal earnings threshold for standard workers and independent 
contractors (€446.81) multiplied by 12 (months).22 These numbers deal with white-collar employees 
(Angestellte). Insurance contributions for blue-collar workers (Arbeiter) were slightly different until 2016 and 
got then aligned to the ones of white-collar employees. 
22 These numbers deal with white-collar employees (Angestellte). Insurance contributions for blue-collar 
workers (Arbeiter) were slightly different until 2016 and got then aligned to the ones of white-collar employees. 
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in 2015 and to 0.35% in 2016. Regarding accident insurance, the contribution rate was 
reduced from 1.4% to 1.3% in 2015, and then further to 1.2% in 2019. Regarding 
unemployment insurance, a reform modifying contribution rates for earners of low 
income came into force from 2009. Under this reform, employee insurance contribution 
rates were made somewhat progressive. In 2019 no insurance contribution has to be 
paid by employees with a gross monthly income below €1,681; for income between 
€1,681 and €1,834 the contribution rate is 1%; for an income between €1,835 and 
€1,987, 2%; and for income exceeding €1,987, the normal 3% (see Table 7). 
For employees, there were no changes in contribution rates for pension insurance.  
Some changes also occurred for self-employed people. When compared with 2005, the 
most important revisions were the raising of their contribution rate for pension insurance 
from 15% to 18.5%, and the reduction of their contribution rate for health insurance 
from 9.1% to 7.65%. These changes were part of an attempt to more closely harmonise 
social insurance contributions for different types of employment. 
Overall, changes in the design of social security contributions have been rather limited 
over the last 15 years. Rules on floors and caps have remained largely unchanged. Some 
attempts have been made to slightly reduce specific contribution rates in order to reduce 
non-wage labour costs. The system of contribution rates has remained largely regressive, 
with the exception of the unemployment insurance scheme, where partial progressivity 
was introduced for employees and freelance contractors with comparatively low earned 
income. 
Attempts to widen social security coverage, in particular, took place in the 1990s. The 
only point worth mentioning in this context is that freelance contracts were also made 
subject to statutory unemployment insurance in 2008 and that self-employed people 
were able to opt in to unemployment insurance from 2009 (see Fink/Nagel 2018). 
Given the limited changes in the area of social insurance, general taxes became, as 
described above, somewhat more important in financing social expenditure. However, it 
appears to be fair to say that this development is not presented as a ‘deliberate’ strategy 
by the relevant political actors. 
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3 Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mix of financing 
options and potential future sources of financing – national 
debate on the topic 
The rather high reliance on social contributions over the last two decades caused some 
political and scientific debate on this issue (see e.g. Leoni 2017; Guger et al. 2008).  
Demographic ageing and economic swings are evidently a challenge for social protection 
systems strongly relying on social insurance contributions. One point repeatedly made in 
this context is that demographic ageing will cause problems for the financial 
sustainability of social protection in Austria, as the overall share of people not actively 
contributing to most branches of social insurance will rise. The relevant parameter in this 
context is the development of earned income, which is subject to social insurance 
contributions. To reduce the dependence on this source of financing a ‘broadening of the 
financing base’ would be an option; for example, by re-introducing direct taxes on 
assets/property – on which, however, political positions are very diverse. One other 
option would be to eradicate the maximum contribution basis (Höchstbeitragsgrundlage) 
for insurance contributions, but without increasing maximum benefits. The latter would 
increase the progressivity of the system of insurance contributions and funds from this 
source. Both options do not appear to be on the political agenda of the current centre-
right coalition government of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPÖ). On the contrary, the government has announced that it will not introduce 
any new taxes and that it plans to reduce total receipts from taxes and contributions 
from around 42.4% of GDP in 2017 to 40% (see Regierungsprogramm 2017, 125). 
One important point is that the Austrian system of taxes and contributions has only a 
slightly progressive effect (see Rocha-Akis et al. 2016 for more details). The progressive 
effect of the income tax system, which increased with the tax reform of 2008-2010, is 
largely offset by the regressive effect of social insurance contributions and indirect taxes. 
To increase progressivity in the tax and contributions system, progressivity of direct 
taxes (i.e. income tax) and especially of social contributions would have to be 
strengthened. The national government announced that it would present details for a 
reform of social insurance contributions and of income tax in April 2019. The declared 
goal is to reduce the tax and contributions burden on low and medium incomes. 
However, the concrete details of the reform are still awaited at the time of writing. 
One other issue repeatedly addressed in scientific and political debates in Austria is that 
the rather strong reliance on social insurance contributions causes substantial non-wage 
labour costs, which might be an obstacle to international competitiveness and might curb 
additional employment. In this context it is worth mentioning that the so-called tax 
wedge on labour costs (i.e. the total tax rate on low-wage earners) is one of the highest 
of all EU Member States, amounting to 45.1% in 2016 (EU-28 average: 38.4%).23 
Furthermore, the tax wedge has been rising continuously in Austria since 2009 (when it 
was 43.2%). The high tax and contributions rate may not only come with adverse effects 
regarding employment growth, but also concerning individual work incentives. 
Strong attempts have been made in Austria to make ‘all types of earned income from 
employment’24 subject to statutory insurance and social contributions. However, no valid 
data are available on the incidence of undeclared work. Evidently, high tax and 
contribution rates on earned income, as they exist in Austria, come with the risk of 
evasion, but empirical evidence on this issue is very limited. 
According to official data, administrative costs and collection costs are rather low in the 
Austrian social insurance system (see Hauptverband 2018), In 2016, they amounted to 
                                                 
23 Source: Eurostat database, indicator [earn_nt_taxwedge]. 
24 Up to the maximum contribution basis (Höchstbeitragsgrundlage); see above Section 2. 
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2.7% of all statutory health insurance spending, and 1.5% of statutory pension insurance 
spending (ibid.).  
Evidently, current and future financing of social protection in Austria comes with a 
number of substantial challenges. Up to now, it appears that ‘incremental adaptation’ has 
often been the guiding principle in this policy area, with strong signs of ‘path 
dependency’, preventing a more structural change. 
Recommendations for a more structural change should, in our view, comprise the 
following points. 
• Social insurance contribution rates on low and medium earned income should be 
reduced, thereby increasing the progressivity of the system and promoting 
employment. 
• Reduced contribution rates on low and medium earned income should be 
compensated for by: 
o re-introducing taxes on assets/property; 
o preventing tax evasion by international companies (including European co-
ordination on this issue); and 
o abolishing the maximum contribution basis (Höchstbeitragsgrundlage) – in 
a first instance, for health insurance.25 
• An even more all-encompassing, and at the same time reasonable, reform of the 
system of income taxes and social insurance contributions would involve changing 
it to an ‘integrated tariff’ with only one system of taxes/contributions on earned 
income. This would improve transparency and further reduce administrative and 
collection costs, and would allow for a clear-cut design regarding progressivity. 
Such a system could not only address income from employment, but also rental, 
leasing and interest income, which would further help ‘broadening the financing 
base’ of social protection (for details see Aiginger et al. 2008). 
                                                 
25 The abolition of the maximum contribution basis could come with issues of constitutionality and would for this 
reason probably have to be decided as a constitutional law. 
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